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Book Review
PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS, by Hanoch Dagan'
BRUCE ZIFF 2
THERE ARE TWO FOUNDATIONAL QUESTIONS in the study of property law. First,

what core meaning, if any, can we give to the concept of property? Second, on
what basis, if any, can we justify this institution? Both of these central concerns
are addressed by Hanoch Dagan in Property: Values and Institutions. This work
deals with property theory in an interesting, engaging, coherent, and insightful
fashion. Overall, I learned a great deal from this book.
Dagan's overarching goal is to "challenge the noted contemporary trends of
conceptual and normative monism" in property law scholarship.' He is referring, as
I understand it, to the tendency he has identified among contemporary thinkers to
argue for comprehensive and holistic answers to the two main questions-the what
and why ofproperty. As to the first issue, he rejects the "misleading binarism whereby
property is either one monistic form structured around Blackstone's formula of
'sole and despotic dominion,' or a formless bundle of rights."4 Property does not
fit with Blackstone's idea of property as conferring a robust right of exclusion, but
neither is the term so malleable in content as to deprive it of any coherent shape
or meaning. Instead, he argues for a middle ground that treats property as a set of
institutions that bear a familial resemblance to each other. Similarly, Dagan eschews
the notion that property can be justified as serving one main goal (such as economic
efficiency) or as a single way of balancing competing objectives. Instead, he argues
that property should advance a range of liberal values including efficiency (and,
more generally, utility), labour, personhood, community, and distributive justice.'
1.

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 311 pages.
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Professor of Law, University of Alberta.
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Supra note 1 at xi.
Ibid.
Ibidat 11-12.
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I accept these two key claims. Property is a tool of human invention, one that
has taken shape over centuries within a diverse range of social settings and has been
filtered through countless institutional processes, including local custom, legislative
edict, and judicial creativity. Therefore, it should not be surprising that the resulting
outputs are complex and sometimes messy and conflicting. The competing goals of
property have been stapled, glued, and welded together in different ways over time.
And, as property laws are human artifacts, it should not be surprising that some
principles of property seem flawed or become so as times change.
What Dagan does, he does well. But the would-be reader should be aware
of what this book is not. First, the book is not a substantially new contribution
to our understanding of property law and theory. This is certainly true in at least
one straightforward way. There are ten chapters in this work, eight of which are
republished articles written by Dagan over more than a decade. The republished
papers have already had an impact. In fact, all but one-the newest piece-have
amassed impressive citation statistics, as the following data indicate:
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter
Chapter

1
4
5
6

"The Craft of Property" (2003), cited in 56 articles;
"Property and the Public Domain" (2006), cited in1 6 articles;
"Takings and Distributive Justice" (1999), cited in 73 articles;
"Just Compensation, Incentives, and Social Meanings"
(2000), cited in 23 articles;
7 "Reimagining Takings Law" (2009), cited in 1 article;
8 "The Liberal Commons" (2001), cited in 114 articles;
9 "Properties of Marriage" (2004), cited in 62 articles;
10 "Conflicts in Property" (2005), cited in 17 articles.

The two new chapters, "Exclusion and Inclusion in Property" and "From
Independence and Interdependence to the Pluralism of Property," are designed
to add a measure of cohesion and to cover topics not found in the prior essays.
I found these new chapters to be the most interesting parts of the book. (Note,
however, that even those two papers are available on the Social Science Research
Network.') The literature cited throughout is, with very minor exceptions, what
was extant at the times that the individual papers were first published. Since they
6. The computation of citations is based on a search using Wesdaw (JLR database), conducted
on 20 August 2011.

7. "Exclusion and Inclusion in Property" (2009) online: <http://www.ssrn.com/
abstract= 1416580>; "From Independence and Interdependence to the Pluralism of Property"
online: <http://www. ssrn.com/abstract=1602017>.
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are of varying vintage, the literature is current to differing dates. Unfortunately, we
do not know whether any of the articles that cite the chapters can be looped back
to support or challenge Dagan's arguments, since none of these appear to be cited.
I am also not convinced that the book offers a particularly fresh vision of the
big questions. As to the core meaning of propertya comparable framework for
analysis was offered by Thomas Merrill over a decade ago. Merrill described three
stylized approaches to defining property, which he labelled (i) single-variable
essentialism, with the variable being the right to exclude; (ii) nominalism, where
property is what the law says it is; and (iii) multi-variable essentialism, meaning
that the core includes the right to exclude coupled with other elements (such as
the right to transfer).' As Merrill argued, these three styles show up in the case
law. In the 1999 decision of the High Court of Australia in Yanner v Eaton,9 a
case dealing with Aboriginal property rights, all three of these definitional forms
can be discerned in the several reasons for judgment. (In the end, 'a majority
adopted a definition that is undeniably nominalist.)
Merrill prefers single-variable essentialism, while Dagan does not. Still, the
point here is that there is no false dichotomy in the Merrill taxonomy. The middleground, multi-variable essentialism, is fairly akin to Dagan's preferred view that,
at best, property defines a set of institutions that share a family resemblance. And
even that metaphor, coined in another context by Ludwig Wittgenstein, is not
novel. The philosopher Alan Carter employed it over twenty years ago to define
property as a jural concept."
Likewise, Dagan's conception of property is fairly similar to Stephen
Munzer's analysis. In A Theory of Property," published in 1990, Munzer sought
to show that there are three main (but not exclusive) rationales for property:
(i) the pursuit of utility and efficiency; (ii) justice and equality; and (iii) desert
based on labour. These various goals can lead to conflict at the operational level
where hard choices need to be made. Both Dagan and Munzer refer to their
approaches as pluralist-and both are. They share the same distrust of one-sizefits-all approaches to the normative bases for property. I do too.12
8.
9.

"Property and the Right to Exclude" (1998) 77 Neb L Rev 730.
(1999) 201 CLR 351 (HCA). A recent online symposium offers some support for Dagan's
critique of the bundle-of-rights versus right of exclusion binarism, but it also contains some
more refined accounts of the meaning of property. See "Symposium" (2011) 8 Econ Journal
Watch, online: <http://econjwatch.org>.
10. The PhilosophicalFoundationsof Property Rights (London, UK: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989)
at 5.
11. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
12. Bruce Ziff, Principlesof Property Law, 5th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2010) at 10-47. See also
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As Property:Values andInstitutions is not a true monograph, we do not receive
a thorough explication and analysis of some important supporting concepts. A
successful example of such work is the late James Harris's Property and Justice.13
Rather, this collection is part of an ongoing conversation among scholars in law
and other fields about the meaning, purposes, and shape of the law of property. It
does not take long to see this: The first substantive chapter, entitled the "Craft of
Property," examines the meaning of property by reference to a controversy around
the tenancy by the entireties, an ancient form of marital property holding. No
longer part of Canadian law, this special type of joint tenancy remains part of the
law of property in a handful of American states. This topic would otherwise seem
an odd place to start a work of this nature.
Owing to the fact that the book is not a stem-to-stern analysis a la James
Harris, it is assumed that the reader understands certain core concepts. Consider,
for instance, the term "personhood." Dagan asserts that the advancement of
personhood interests is an appropriate aim of the law of property. A book that
seeks to methodically convince its reader would, I think, want to explain and
to interrogate the meaning of that word. There is, among other things, a wealth
of literature on the psychological dimensions of ownership that might help us
understand the role that personhood should play in defining property rights."
However, to be able to benefit from this work, one must already be conversant
with that concept.
There is also no innovative methodological approach in this anthology. It
is a theoretical inquiry, which draws on doctrine on a need-to-know basis. Of
course, there remains warrant to pursue those meta-questions in the very manner
employed in this book. However, to examine questions in this way is destined to
increase our understanding only at the margins. The return on the intellectual
investment is likely to be minimal. In contrast, there are vast areas of inquiry
that remain under-examined. In that latter category I place, pre-eminently, our
knowledge of the empirical world of property: what we know about how owners
act, what conduct property law actually affects, what effect a given reform of
property law has had on the behavior of owners, and so forth.
Consider the chapter on the liberal commons, which is an abbreviated
version of an article co-written with Michael Heller. It provides a framework
for understanding the optimal structure of co-ownership rules, and it identifies
Nestor Davidson, "Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law" (2008) 61 Vand L Rev
1597 at 1637 etseq.
13. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996).
14. See the literature cited in Ziff, supra note 12 at 30ff.
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weaknesses in the current law. That is a worthwhile endeavour, although parts of
the chapter lack sufficient examples and reference points for my taste. I accept
the importance of adopting effective and sensible default rules. Nevertheless, I
kept asking myself: How many unwieldy co-ownership arrangements are out
there? Surely, the typical legal framework for a serious commercial venture is to
repose ownership in a corporation in which the sharing is accomplished through
(the aptly named) shares. More generally, I wonder whether the current default
rules cause grief to many co-owners. My guess is that the overwhelming majority
of co-ownership relationships involve two parties, that most of those parties are
spouses, that joint tenancy is the most commonly used form, and that accounting
problems-even if not fully anticipated at the outset-are largely ironed out
based on common sense and expectations as to how the law might respond. I
surmise that many such resolutions occur in the course of nuanced and contextladen bargaining. Of course, I don't know whether any of that is true, and neither,
it seems, does Dagan.
Dagan's book, then, serves as an illustration of a larger complaint I have about
current property law scholarship-a complaint to which I, too, feel vulnerable.
There is no robust tradition of empirical study of property law, and that limits
what we can hope to accomplish. Dagan uses existing empirical information to
good effect in various places. Even so, as I read his collection, I tried to spot
moments where the author needed to fall back on assumptions, educated guesses,
and hunches. There are plenty of places where data would help.
Property: Values and Institutions is an interesting and well-written book in
which a range of cogent arguments and ideas about the law of property are
assembled in one volume. Do not expect more.

